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LYNN E. BLAIS 
In their lead essay for this volume, Wesley Horton and Levesque 
persuasively demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kelo v. City of New London was neither novel nor wrong. They then 
suggest that Kelo’s detractors drop their continued crusade to overturn 
that decision and shift their focus from challenging the use of eminent 
domain for private economic development plans to challenging eminent 
domain abuse in general. To that end, Horton and Leveque offer the 
provocative proposal that the Court adopt a ten-factor heightened rational 
basis test to apply to all condemnations. Using this test, they argue, courts 
can invalidate ill-advised exercises of eminent domain while upholding 
condemnations that truly serve a public purpose.   
I agree with Horton and Levesque’s defense of Kelo. That decision 
clearly follows from the Court’s prior precedent and correctly implements 
the Public Use Clause. In this Essay, however, I challenge the wisdom of 
Horton and Levesque’s proposal to subject all condemnations to 
heightened rational basis review under their ten-factor test. This proposal, 
I argue, finds no support in existing doctrine and invites widespread 
judicial intrusion into the legislative domain in a manner that is neither 
authorized nor well-advised. 
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The Public Use Clause and  
Heightened Rational Basis Review 
LYNN E. BLAIS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wesley Horton and Brendon Levesque’s essay provides an interesting 
reflection on their litigation and oral argument strategy in Kelo v. City of 
New London1 ten years after it was decided, as well as an apt analysis of 
the opinion and a provocative prescription for moving Kelo forward.2 In 
Kelo, the United States Supreme Court rejected property owners’ Public 
Use Clause challenge to the city’s condemnation of their homes as part of a 
comprehensive economic redevelopment plan, holding that the Public Use 
Clause permits only minimal judicial oversight of legislative decisions to 
exercise the power of eminent domain.3 In particular, the Court reaffirmed 
its long-standing holdings that public use is a broad concept encompassing 
all uses that serve a public purpose, and that courts should “afford[] 
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use 
of the takings power.”4 In the first part of their essay, Horton and Levesque 
convincingly demonstrate that the decision in Kelo is not an aberration but 
rather a straightforward application of settled takings principles.5 In the 
second part of the paper, Horton and Levesque suggest that Kelo opponents 
abandon their attempts to carve out bright line rules to constrain the 
exercise of eminent domain and instead build on Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Kelo to develop a multi-factored test for determining when 
a proposed exercise of eminent domain would serve a public purpose and 
when it would not.6  
Horton and Levesque’s first point—that Kelo is consistent with the 
Court’s prior precedent and was correctly decided—is well taken. Horton 
and Levesque persuasively show that the Kelo decision is a logical 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor Blais is a Co-Director of the Supreme Court Clinic and the Leroy G. Denman, Jr. 
Regents Professor in Real Property Law at the University of Texas School of Law. She thanks the 
editors of the Connecticut Law Review for publishing this interesting collection of essays, and for their 
careful and helpful editing work on her essay. 
1 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
2 Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405 
(2016). 
3 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88. 
4 Id. at 483.  
5 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1408. 
6 Id. at 1426. 
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outgrowth of the Court’s most well-known Public Use Clause decisions, 
Berman v. Parker7 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,8 as well as 
cases that preceded those.9 Moreover, Horton and Levesque artfully 
explore four instrumental concepts—precedent, federalism, compensation, 
and democracy—that confirm the wisdom of the Court’s determination in 
Kelo that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not an absolute 
bar to the exercise of eminent domain for economic development.10 
 Horton and Levesque’s next point—that Public Use Clause challenges 
should be resolved by applying a ten-factor balancing test to proposed 
condemnations—is less persuasive. Horton and Levesque assert that 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo provides a road map for “look[ing] 
more carefully at all condemnations . . . to see whether they qualify as a 
public use.”11 According to the authors, the bright-line rules proposed by 
Kelo opponents and rejected by the Kelo majority are both over-broad and 
under-inclusive.12 For example, a rule prohibiting only condemnations that 
transfer private property to a private developer for economic development 
would “automatically delineate[] a public road or a bridge to nowhere as a 
public use, and automatically delineate[] private economic development as 
not.”13 In contrast, Horton and Levesque claim that a new “rational-basis-
with-a-bite”14 test built on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence “may possibly 
kill a publicly owned and operated boondoggle (such as, perhaps, a sports 
stadium) [but] [i]t may also save a privately owned development plan that 
a judge finds has a reasonable chance to succeed in reviving a dying 
city.”15 To determine whether a proposed use of eminent domain passes 
constitutional muster under the Public Use Clause, Horton and Levesque 
propose the following ten-factor test:  
(1) Will a public body own or operate the property? (2) How 
specific is the stated use? (3) Is it reasonably possible the 
stated use will actually succeed? (4) Is the stated use clearly a 
pretext? (5) Does the public gain outweigh any private gain? 
(6) Is there clearly improper favoritism? (7) Is there clearly 
                                                                                                                          
7 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
8 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
9 See Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1414–16 (“There is quite a large body of law on how 
far governments can go in regulating the use of private property before it becomes an inverse 
condemnation.”).   
10 Id. at 1414, 1418. 
11 Id. at 1426.   
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. Although Horton and Levesque use the phrase “rational-basis-with-a-bite,” other scholars 
more commonly refer to it as “rational basis with bite.” I prefer the more descriptive “heightened 
rational basis review,” and will use that phrase throughout this piece.  
15 Id. 
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improper targeting of a disfavored group? (8) Is the particular 
property in question on the periphery of the project? (9) Is 
there a comprehensive plan that any private developer must 
follow? (10) Were any private beneficiaries known at the 
time of the vote to condemn?16 
In this response, I address the prescriptive portion of Horton and 
Levesque’s essay. Although I applaud their efforts to move property rights 
proponents away from their crusade for bright-line rules, I do not endorse 
their proposal to apply heightened rational basis review to Public Use 
Clause challenges as the best path forward. I take issue with Horton and 
Levesque’s proposal for several reasons. First, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Kelo neither suggests nor supports such an intensive multi-
factored inquiry into the merits of every eminent domain plan challenged 
under the public use clause. Second, the case on which Horton and 
Levesque seek to base their expanded heightened rational basis test—City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.17—also does not support the 
broad application of that level of scrutiny to every condemnation. Third, 
the Supreme Court has already rejected the use of heightened rational basis 
review for other Takings Clause challenges, and its reasoning in those 
cases applies with equal force to the Public Use Clause context. Finally, 
even if Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and Cleburne Living Center could 
be read to support the heightened scrutiny proposed by Horton and 
Levesque, and even if the Court had not already rejected the use of 
heightened rational basis review for Takings Clause challenges, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts should decline to embrace it now. The 
Fifth Amendment should not be interpreted to deputize federal courts to 
engage in the sort of pervasive, undisciplined review of the merits of 
democratically adopted eminent domain plans that the ten-factor test would 
entail. Federal courts are neither authorized nor well suited to engage in 
such an intensive merits-driven inquiry. Ultimately, Horton and 
Levesque’s proposed Public Use Clause test would enlist federal courts in 
oversight of democratic decision-making that they are neither justified in 
undertaking nor competent to perform.    
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE IN KELO  
Horton and Levesque recommend that opponents of the Kelo decision 
stop advocating for a bright-line rule that they claim does not line up well 
with the merits of eminent domain decisions and instead advance a 
heightened rational basis review standard that will ask courts to distinguish 
good eminent domain decisions from bad ones, upholding the good and 
                                                                                                                          
16 Id. at 1426–27.   
17 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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invalidating the bad.18 Horton and Levesque identify the seeds of their 
proposed heightened rational basis review in Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Kelo.19 
However, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo neither suggests nor 
supports the multi-factored test proposed by Horton and Levesque. Horton 
and Levesque concede that “Justice Kennedy’s test . . . is not well 
developed in his concurring opinion.”20 That, of course, is because the 
heightened rational basis review endorsed by Horton and Levesque is not 
Justice Kennedy’s test at all. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo was 
concerned with the possibility of pretext, not with the substantive merit of 
every eminent domain decision, and he proposed more searching scrutiny 
of a local government’s decision to use eminent domain only if there was 
credible evidence that the proffered “public use” was a pretext for a project 
that was “intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental 
or pretextual public benefits.”21   
That Justice Kennedy was not proposing that all exercises of eminent 
domain be subject to a blanket heightened rational basis test is clear from 
his concurrence. He begins by reiterating the deferential rational basis test 
adopted by the majority, and then explains that he writes separately only to 
clarify that the deferential standard of review “does not . . . alter the fact 
that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private 
entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are 
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”22 According to Justice Kennedy, only 
if “confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to 
private parties” should a court “review the record to see if [the accusation] 
has merit.”23 Even then, Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the court should 
review the record “with the presumption that the government’s actions 
were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.”24   
Perhaps Horton and Levesque’s proposal is meant to build on Justice 
Kennedy’s concession that there may be “a more narrowly drawn category 
of takings” for which a more stringent standard of review might be 
appropriate.25 If so, it not only goes much farther than Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence contemplated, it distorts the focus of Justice Kennedy’s 
concern. Justice Kennedy never suggested that a more stringent standard of 
review should apply to all eminent domain decisions. Rather, he posited 
the possible appropriateness of a more stringent standard only in the 
                                                                                                                          
18 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1425–26.   
19 Id. at 1426.  
20 Id. 
21 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
22 Id. at 490. 
23 Id. at 491. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 493. 
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context of eminent domain involving private transfers, and even then only 
to those “categories of cases in which the [private] transfers are so 
suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported 
benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an 
impermissible private purpose.”26 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that 
a more stringent standard of review might be appropriate in some cases 
cannot support Horton and Levesque’s proposal that the Court adopt 
heightened rational basis review for every exercise of eminent domain. As 
is widely understood, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was addressed to the 
particular problem of pretext,27 not the broader concerns of overreaching 
and bad judgments in the exercse of eminent domain that underlie the 
continuing opposition to Kelo.   
III. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER AND THE PURPOSE OF HEIGHTENED 
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
Horton and Levesque bolster their suggestion that Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence was “implicitly promoting the rational-basis-with-a-bite test” 
by pointing to the opinion’s citation to Cleburne Living Center.28 This 
claim distorts the central point of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in part 
because it is clear that he was invoking Cleburne Living Center for a 
different reason, and in greater part because Cleburne Living Center itself 
did not adopt the generalized heightened rational basis review that Horton 
and Levesque advocate.    
In his concurrence in Kelo, Justice Kennedy cited Cleburne Living 
Center for the unexceptional proposition that “a court applying rational-
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a 
government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class 
of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.”29 
This reference provides the equal protection corollary of his Public Use 
Clause point—that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the 
Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is 
intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or 
pretextual public benefits.”30 Neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the 
Public Use Clause formulation referred to by Justice Kennedy invokes 
judicial review of the general merits of all government decisions. Rather, 
                                                                                                                          
26 Id. 
27 I have explored the difficulties entailed in attempting to ferret out pretext in the exercise of 
eminent domain in an earlier article. See Lynn E. Blais, The Problem with Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 963, 974 (2011) (discussing how the concept of pretext is inadequate to inform the public use 
requirement of the eminent domain analysis).  
28 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1418.   
29 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
30 Id.  
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under both formulations heightened rational basis review is reserved for 
the special circumstance where a particular class is singled out for harm in 
a suspicious way, or where a particular party is singled out for a suspicious 
benefit. Moreover, even in those limited circumstances, the court’s role is 
circumscribed. A court is authorized to look more closely only upon a 
“clear showing” of special harm or special benefit, and in its close analysis 
to look only for evidence of pretextual or incidental public purpose or 
benefit.31 Horton and Levesque’s proposal to expand this limited 
heightened rational basis review to a sweeping assessment of the merits of 
every condemnation decision would upend the traditional role of courts 
and local governments and interject courts too deeply into traditional 
governmental decision making. 
Horton and Levesque’s argument that Cleburne Living Center adopted 
a generalized heightened rational basis test that should be imported into the 
Public Use Clause inquiry appears to be based on a misapprehension of 
Cleburne Living Center.32 In that case, the Court invalidated a city zoning 
ordinance that required a special use permit for the construction of 
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded” as it applied to Cleburne 
Living Center’s proposal to operate a group home for individuals with 
intellectual disabilities.33 In so doing, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding that individuals with intellectual disabilities are a “quasi-suspect” 
class and that the ordinance should therefore be subject to heightened 
scrutiny.34 Instead, the Court claimed to apply rational basis review but 
nonetheless struck down the ordinance as applied to the proposed group 
home.35 After carefully evaluating all of the proffered justifications for 
treating group homes for the intellectually disabled differently from, for 
example, apartment houses, nursing homes, and fraternity or sorority 
houses, the Court invalidated the ordinance because “the record does not 
reveal any rational basis for believing that the [group home] would pose 
any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests”36 and therefore 
“requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mentally retarded.”37  
To be fair, Horton and Levesque are not the only commentators to 
interpret Cleburne Living Center as adopting a generalized heightened 
rational basis test. After all, the Court expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
invocation of strict scrutiny yet carefully examined and rejected all of the 
                                                                                                                          
31 Id. 
32 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1418. 
33 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 432, 436, 450 (1985). 
34 Id. at 442–45.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 448. 
         37 Id. at 450. 
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reasons offered by the city in support of its zoning ordinance. In fact, 
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Cleburne Living Center takes the majority to 
task for obfuscating its analysis by disclaiming the applicability of 
heightened review while actually engaging in it.38 Soon after the opinion 
was handed down, scholars began to characterize the Court’s analysis as 
“rational basis with bite.”39  
But the general heightened rational basis review interpretation of 
Cleburne Living Center has not endured, neither among scholars nor in the 
Court.40 Indeed, Justice Marshall’s dissent was the first analysis of the 
Cleburne Living Center opinion to provide a more nuanced description of 
the majority’s analysis. As the dissent made clear, the majority was 
disingenuous in claiming that it was not engaged in heightened scrutiny, 
and this obfuscation left lower courts with “no principled foundation for 
determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”41 So Justice 
Marshall sought to fill that void by suggesting that “the level of scrutiny 
employed in an equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional 
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the 
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.’”42 In this case, he argued, the establishment of a 
home is of particular social importance, and the intellectually disabled 
“have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic history’ of segregation and 
discrimination that can only be called grotesque.”43 Accordingly, he 
concluded that given “the importance of the interest at stake and the history 
of discrimination the retarded have suffered, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires us to do more than review the distinctions drawn by Cleburne’s 
                                                                                                                          
         38 See id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]the Court’s heightened-scrutiny discussion is even 
more puzzling given that Cleburne’s ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the 
sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny.”).  
         39 See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any 
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779–80 (1987) (noting that “[m]any commentators have suggested that 
these opinions represent an effort by the Court to put more ‘teeth’ in the rational basis test”). The 
concept of rational basis with bite was first introduced into the scholarly lexicon by Gerald Gunther. 
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) (arguing that the Court should put “consistent 
new bite into the old equal protection” by declining to “supply justifying rationales by exercising its 
imagination”).   
         40 See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 373–82 (1999) (arguing that Gerald 
Gunther’s theory that the Court developed a new “rational basis with bite” standard had not stood the 
test of time); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 899 (2012) 
(“But as subsequent commentators noted, the ‘rational basis with bite’ standard did not have much in 
the way of legs.”). 
         41 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
         42 Id.  
         43 Id. at 461 (quoting University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) 
(opinion of Powell, J.)). 
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zoning ordinance as if they appeared in a taxing statute or in economic or 
commercial legislation.”44 The majority, he asserted, had applied 
heightened rational basis review as a result of an essential trigger (the 
importance of the issue at stake) to determine whether an impermissible 
purpose (discrimination against a disadvantaged group) was the true 
purpose of the legislation.   
This “trigger-purpose” formulation of the Court’s use of heightened 
rational basis review has emerged as the enduring interpretation among 
scholars and within the Court. For example, in 2015 Raphael Holoszyc-
Pimentel analyzed every Supreme Court decision invalidating an ordinance 
under rational basis review and concluded that this heightened rational 
basis review is most often applied to laws that classify on the basis of an 
immutable characteristic or that burden a significant right.45 Similarly, 
Susannah Pollvogt has argued convincingly that the Court’s “real concern 
in many of these [rational basis with bite] cases was with ends and not 
means––that insufficient tailoring was merely symptomatic of an improper 
purpose: animus.”46 Thus, in its heightened rational basis review cases, the 
Court’s scrutiny is triggered by a legislative classification that raises a 
realistic concern that the object of the legislative action is impermissible, 
not that the action is somehow not closely enough tailored to a permissible 
legislative goal. 
 The Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the “trigger-purpose” 
theory of heightened rational basis review, explaining that it employs more 
searching rational basis scrutiny when a challenged law is based on 
classifications that are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest that the laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”47 As Justice O’Connor noted in 
                                                                                                                          
         44 Id. at 464. 
        45 Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis 
Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072, 2105 (2015).  
         46 See Pollvogt, supra note 40, at 899–900 (recasting the “rational basis with bite” cases as 
instances of heightened scrutiny aimed at ferreting out unconstitutional animus); see also Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 327 (1997) (citations 
omitted) (“Recently, however, the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence—especially in the areas of equal 
protection and free speech—has revealed a renewed attention to the legitimacy of governmental 
purposes, including some consideration of how legitimacy is to be determined by the judiciary. In the 
equal protection context, starting with the 1973 Moreno decision, and continuing with Cleburne in 
1985 and Romer v. Evans this past Term, the Court has struck down non-suspect legislative 
classifications on the grounds that the legislative purpose of ‘harm[ing] a politically unpopular group’ 
is incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause.”); Farrell, supra note 40, at 411–15 (concluding that 
at least five of the ten “rational basis with bite” cases in the Court between 1971 and 1999 are more 
properly classified as impermissible purpose cases); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 763 (2011) (“Rational basis with bite depends on the idea that governmental 
‘animus’ alone is never enough to sustain legislation.”).  
         47 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). 
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Lawrence v. Texas,48 “[w]hen a law exhibits such a desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group, [the Court has] applied a more searching form 
of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”49 
It is to this animus-based heightened rational basis review that Justice 
Kennedy alluded in Kelo. His concurrence was not a call to subject all 
eminent domain decisions to “rational basis with a bite” review, as Horton 
and Levesque suggest.50 Rather, his concurrence reiterated the Court’s 
long-held view that certain legislative goals are not constitutionally 
permissible, regardless of the closeness of fit between the means and the 
ends.51 In the context of the Public Use Clause the constitutionally 
impermissible legislative goal is purely private benefit—Justice Kennedy 
wrote separately in Kelo to emphasize that the exercise of eminent domain 
must be struck down if the condemnation was in fact undertaken solely to 
confer a private benefit and the public benefit that was offered to justify it 
was merely pretextual or incidental.52 
IV. HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AND THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE 
Perhaps the most damning critique of Horton and Levesque’s proposal 
to adopt a heightened rational basis test for all eminent domain decisions is 
that it would require overturning years of Supreme Court precedent. For 
more than 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the use 
of a generalized heightened rational basis review in the Public Use Clause 
context, including in Kelo itself.53 The Court in Kelo made clear that 
heightened rational basis review had no place in Public Use Clause 
                                                                                                                          
         48 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
         49 Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
         50 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1418.  
         51 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
         52 Id. at 490–491.  
         53 Of course, the Court has imported heightened scrutiny into takings cases in the context of 
exactions, requiring that a condition on a land use permit have an essential nexus to the reason for 
which the permit could have been denied and rough proportionality with the projected impact of the 
permitted use. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389–90 (1994) (adopting a “reasonable 
relationship” test whereby the proposed land use requirement must have a reasonable relationship or 
nexus to the use to which the property is being made); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 836–37 (1987) (determining that a condition on land use designed to further a given purpose 
cannot be sustained within a state’s police powers if the essential nexus between the prohibition and the 
stated purpose is eliminated). In doing so, the Court made clear that the essential nexus/rough 
proportionality inquiry was not heightened rational basis review, and, in fact, expressly declined to call 
its new heightened scrutiny by a term that might be confused with rational basis review. See Dolan, 512 
U.S. at 391 (“We think the ‘reasonable relationship’ test adopted by a majority of the state courts is 
closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not adopt 
it as such, partly because the term ‘reasonable relationship’ seems confusingly similar to the term 
‘rational basis’ which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 1508 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1497 
challenges when it said, “[f]or more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed . . . intrusive scrutiny in favor of 
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs 
justify the use of the takings power.”54 Justice Kennedy both joined that 
decision and reiterated the point in his concurrence, stating “[t]his Court 
has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public 
Use Clause . . . as long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public 
purpose.’”55 This emphatic embrace of deferential rational basis review is 
consistent with the Court’s prior Public Use Clause cases.56   
Moreover, in a case decided the same term as Kelo, the Court finally 
eliminated the specter of heightened rational basis review in regulatory 
takings cases, for many of the same reasons it has consistently rejected that 
level of scrutiny in Public Use Clause cases.57 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc.,58 the Court rejected Chevron’s regulatory takings challenge to a 
Hawaii statute limiting the amount of rent that an oil company could 
charge a lessee service station.59 Chevron based its challenge on the 
Court’s oft-repeated statement that “government regulation of private 
property ‘effects a taking if [such regulation] does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests . . . .’”60 Although the Court had never 
decided a regulatory takings case using this “substantially advance[d] 
legitimate state[-]interests” standard, the phrase had been repeated so often 
in its decisions that it had “been read [by lower courts] to announce a 
stand-alone regulatory takings test.”61 The Lingle Court put an end to that 
misadventure, holding that “this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature 
of a due process, not a takings, test, and . . . it has no proper place in our 
takings jurisprudence.”62 In particular, the Lingle Court explained that its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence was intended to identify those regulations 
                                                                                                                          
         54 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. In light of this statement, Horton and Levesques’ claim that the majority 
did not embrace very deferential rational basis review in Kelo is inexplicable. See Horton & Levesque, 
supra note 2, at 1427 (“the ‘anything goes’ rational basis test was not repeated”). 
55 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
56 See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of 
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never 
held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26, 32 (1954) (“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power . . 
. . The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is 
an extremely narrow one.”).  
57 See Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 77 n.60 (2012) 
(explaining that the Court rejected “the possibility of any elevated means-ends analysis in the 
regulatory takings context”). 
58 544 U.S. 528 (2005).  
59 Id. at 532.  
60 Id. at 531 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (bracketed language in 
original). 
61 Id. at 540. 
62 Id.  
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that “forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”63 Thus, the 
Court explained, regulatory takings tests look to the magnitude and 
distribution of the burdens of land use regulation, not to their relative 
effectiveness.64 As the Court further explained: 
The owner of a property subject to a regulation that 
effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as 
singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property 
subject to an ineffective regulation. It would make little sense 
to say that the second owner has suffered a taking while the 
first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regulation may not 
significantly burden property rights at all, and it may 
distribute any burden broadly and evenly among property 
owners. The notion that such a regulation nevertheless 
“takes” private property for public use merely by virtue of its 
ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.65 
The Lingle Court rejected heightened rational basis review for 
regulatory takings challenges not only because it is “doctrinally 
untenable,”66 but also because “it would require courts to scrutinize the 
efficacy of a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which 
courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower—and might often 
require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected 
legislatures and expert agencies.”67 I have argued previously that the 
reasoning in Lingle applies with equal force to the Kelo Court’s concern 
for pretext in the eminent domain context,68 and other scholars have 
concurred.69 At the very least, the reasoning in Lingle powerfully 
undermines Horton and Levesque’s argument that the Court should 
embrace a generalized heightened rational basis review in every case 
invoking the Public Use Clause to challenge the exercise of eminent 
domain.  
V. HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW, THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE, 
AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE  
Of course, it is possible that Horton and Levesque’s proposal is a good 
idea even if it isn’t supported by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo or 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
64 Id. at 543–44. 
65 Id. at 543 (emphasis omitted). 
66 Id. at 544. 
67 Id.  
68 Blais, supra note 27, at 982–83. 
69 Fennell, supra note 57, at 77 n.60.  
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by the Court’s existing Public Use Clause cases or its heightened rational 
basis review jurisprudence. However, careful scrutiny of their suggestion 
that every exercise of eminent domain should be subject to heightened 
rational basis review under a detailed ten-factor test70 reveals several ways 
in which it causes more mischief than it prevents. First, the application of 
heightened rational basis review to every governmental eminent domain 
will likely flood the courts with takings cases, yet Horton and Levesque 
offer no evidence or argument about the extent of the benefit they expect 
from this dramatic increase in judicial oversight of state and local 
government decision making. Second, the proposal sets out ten factors for 
courts to consider in resolving Public Use Clause challenges without 
providing any guidance as to how the factors should be weighed, especially 
if they conflict. Finally, the avowed purpose of the proposed ten-factor 
test—to differentiate between good eminent domain decisions and bad 
ones71—would involve courts in a substantive review of the merits of 
economic legislation in a manner inconsistent with the appropriate and 
acceptable roles of the two branches.  
Horton and Levesque’s proposal would permit (perhaps encourage) 
landowners to raise a Public Use Clause challenge to every proposed 
eminent domain project. Under the Court’s current Public Use Clause 
jurisprudence, challenges to the exercise of eminent domain for the 
construction of publicly owned infrastructure are destined to fail and 
therefore unlikely to be brought.72 Similarly, under existing Public Use 
Clause jurisprudence, the use of eminent domain for projects that would be 
“used by the public” is clearly constitutional.73 But one of the primary 
purposes of the Horton and Levesque proposal is to change that. As they 
say, “a proposal for a public road may in fact more easily meet Kennedy’s 
test than a private economic development plan.”74 Thus, countless 
condemnations for uses that are currently well-established as public uses 
would be vulnerable to legal challenge under Horton and Levesque’s 
proposal, greatly increasing the case loads of state and federal courts. But 
                                                                                                                          
70 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1426–27.   
71 Id.  
72 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497–99 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Our cases have generally identified three categories of takings that comply with the public use 
requirement . . . . First, the sovereign may transfer private property to public ownership—such as for a 
road, a hospital, or a military base.”); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 708 (1923) 
(“[W]e conclude that these highways will . . . afford accommodation to the traveling public, and that 
the taking of land for them is a taking for a public use authorized by the law[] . . . .”). Cf. Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (“We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting 
the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”). 
73 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (“[I]t is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private 
party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a 
railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.”). 
74 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1426. 
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Horton and Levesque do not explain how this increase in cases will better 
implement the Public Use Clause or safeguard constitutionally protected 
property rights. They allude to a “public road or bridge to nowhere” and a 
“publicly owned and operated boondoggle” as targets of their proposed 
ten-factor test, but do not elaborate. Is the nation filled with public roads to 
nowhere and publicly owned and operated boondoggles, built on the backs 
of oppressed private property owners? If so, Horton and Levesque’s 
proposal would benefit from the inclusion of examples of actual publicly 
owned roads and bridges to nowhere or other public works boondoggles 
that their ten-factor test would have identified and invalidated before they 
were built. Without such examples, a reader is left wondering whether the 
potential payoff of such a wholesale expansion of judicial review of state 
and local decision-making would be worth the cost.   
Moreover, once these multitudes of Public Use Clause cases get to 
court, Horton and Levesque’s proposal offers courts little guidance in how 
to resolve them. Horton and Levesque suggest that courts assess the 
proposed eminent domain projects using the following ten factors:  
 (1) Will a public body own or operate the property? (2)  
How specific is the stated use? (3) Is it reasonably possible 
the stated use will actually succeed? (4) Is the stated use 
clearly a pretext? (5) Does the public gain outweigh any 
private gain? (6) Is there clearly improper favoritism? (7) Is 
there clearly improper targeting of a disfavored group? (8) Is 
the particular property in question on the periphery of the 
project? (9) Is there a comprehensive plan that any private 
developer must follow? (10) Were any private beneficiaries 
known at the time of the vote to condemn?75   
They do not, however, offer any guidance into how those factors should be 
evaluated or weighed against one another. 
In considering Horton and Levesque’s ten-factor test, I found it helpful 
to regroup the factors based on the focus of each inquiry. It appears that 
factors four, six, and seven would be outcome determinative. In fact, factor 
four simply restates the holding in Kelo—both the majority opinion and 
Kennedy’s concurrence agreed that the exercise of eminent domain for 
purely pretexual purposes is unconstitutional under the Public Use 
Clause.76 Similarly, by including the term “improper” within factors six 
                                                                                                                          
75 Id. at 1426–27. 
76 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (“Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext 
of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”); Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does not, 
however, alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, 
with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”).  
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and seven, these factors essentially become outcome determinative also.77 
One presumes that government action involving “clearly improper 
favoritism” or “clearly improper targeting of a disfavored group” is already 
unlawful, unless Horton and Levesque are proposing a new concept of 
improper specific to this area of the law.78 If so, the content of that concept 
should be fleshed out.   
That leaves seven factors to be considered in cases where one of the 
three outcome determinative inquiries is not satisfied.79 We can further 
categorize these seven factors into those aimed at identifying pretext and 
those aimed at assessing the wisdom of the proposed condemnation. 
Factors one, five, and ten appear to be aimed at identifying pretext, 
whereas factors two, three, eight, and nine seem to be intended to evaluate 
the merits of the governmental decision to use eminent domain for the 
project in question.80 
Nowhere in their article, however, do Horton and Leveque offer any 
guidance on the appropriate weight to be given to any of these factors, or 
on what a court should do if it determines that several of the factors 
suggest contradictory outcomes. Nor does the article provide sufficient 
theoretical justification for the ten-factor test to permit a thoughtful court 
to discern the appropriate weights and resolutions for itself. For example, 
consider a court faced with a Public Use Clause challenge to a proposed 
condemnation. If none of the three outcome determinative factors are 
satisfied, the court must evaluate the proposed eminent domain project 
using the remaining seven factors. Imagine that after taking extensive 
evidence the court concludes that: (1) the project will be owned by a public 
body; (3) it is reasonably possible that the stated use will actually succeed; 
(5) the private gain outweighs the public gain by a considerable margin but 
the public gain is large; (8) the particular property in question is on the 
periphery of the project; (9) there is a comprehensive plan for the project; 
and (10) there were private beneficiaries known at the time of the vote to 
condemn. These findings appear to cut in competing directions: the public 
ownership, likelihood of success, and comprehensive plan indicate that the 
project serves a public use, but the private gain, known private 
                                                                                                                          
77 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1426–27.  
78 Alternatively, these two factors can be seen as similar to the triggers for heightened rational 
basis review discussed above. But triggers are conceptually different from factors in a multi-factor test, 
and Horton and Levesque’s inclusion of these triggers in their proposal as mere factors obfuscates 
rather than clarifies current law.    
79 Id. (including factors one, two, three, five, eight, nine, and ten). As noted above, under current 
Public Use Clause jurisprudence if the project was to be owned by a public entity, this factor would 
also be determinative. I include it in the remaining test because I understand Horton and Levesque to be 
proposing to change the current law in this regard. 
80 Of course, some of the factors might be relevant to both inquiries. For example, the existence of 
a comprehensive plan could demonstrate the merits of a proposed project as well as decrease the 
likelihood that the public use component was pretextual or incidental.    
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beneficiaries, and peripheral nature of the property suggest that the 
condemnation might be serving a private interest. But Horton and 
Levesque offer no guidance to a court tasked with resolving a Public Use 
Clause challenge in such a case. Indeed, Horton and Leveque offer a 
similar example, drawn from the New London development plan at issue in 
Kelo, by suggesting that some aspects of the plan could have been 
different: “Suppose the owner was New London itself? Suppose the lease 
was for twenty years? Suppose New London actually operated the 
project?”81 They then assert that “the answer to these questions would be 
relevant to a decision, but they should not be conclusive.”82 Nowhere, 
however, do they explain why the answers would be relevant, why they 
should not be conclusive, or even how they should be evaluated.   
Takings jurisprudence, which already has a long and troubled 
relationship with undertheorized multi-factored tests, will not benefit by 
the addition of a longer, more multi-factored test. In the regulatory takings 
context, land use regulations that interfere with a landowner’s use of her 
property are evaluated under an “essentially ad-hoc, factual inquir[y]” that 
employs three factors: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the 
economic impact of the government action; and (3) the degree of 
interference with distinct investment-backed expectations.83 Although this 
test includes only three (not ten) factors, courts and commentators have 
long lamented its indeterminacy and lack of coherence as a standard for 
deciding when land use regulations constitute compensable takings.84 
Horton and Leveque’s proposed ten-factor test, lacking in general 
theoretical foundation and concrete practical guidance, threatens to bring 
even more incoherence and indeterminacy to takings jurisprudence via the 
Public Use Clause.     
Finally, even if Horton and Levesque’s proposal could be implemented 
to permit courts to make reasoned and consistent distinctions between good 
                                                                                                                          
81 Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1427. 
82 Id.  
83 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
84 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561–62 (1984) (citations omitted) (“By far the most intractable constitutional 
property issue is whether certain governmental actions ‘take’ property without satisfying the 
constitutional requirements of due process and just compensation. A number of property theorists have 
addressed this vexing issue, but they have yet to agree on the proper disposition. Instead, commentators 
propose test after test to define ‘takings,’ while courts continue to reach ad hoc determinations rather 
than principled resolutions.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1089 (1993) (citations 
omitted) (“This confusion only worsened in 1978 with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, in which the Court . . . foreswore the pursuit of general principles to resolve takings cases and 
held that judges must instead engage in ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’ The Court’s results under 
this ‘ad hoc’ approach easily earned the continuing admiration of commentators for the ‘disarray’ they 
produced.”). But see Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 525, 529–30 (2009) (arguing that the “conceptual fuzziness” and “indeterminacy and imprecision” 
of the Penn Central factors are inevitable and are an “explicitly realist solution” to difficult cases).  
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eminent domain projects and bad ones, its adoption would be inconsistent 
with the appropriate roles of legislative decision makers and courts. Courts 
are particularly poorly suited to assess some of the factors included in 
Horton and Levesque’s ten-factor test. For example, courts are ill-equipped 
to decide whether a project is reasonably likely to succeed, and there is 
certainly no reason to believe that a court’s determination of this issue 
would be more accurate than that of state and local legislative decision 
makers. Thus, requiring courts to attempt these assessments would likely 
interfere with legitimate and important state and local projects. The Kelo 
Court recognized these concerns when it expressly rejected judicial 
oversight of the likelihood of a project’s success:   
“When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means 
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates 
over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the 
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not 
to be carried out in the federal courts . . . .” The 
disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially 
pronounced in this type of case. Orderly implementation of a 
comprehensive redevelopment plan obviously requires that 
the legal rights of all interested parties be established before 
new construction can be commenced. A constitutional rule 
that required postponement of the judicial approval of every 
condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had 
been assured would unquestionably impose a significant 
impediment to the successful consummation of many such 
plans.85 
Moreover, the basic premise of Horton and Levesque’s proposal—that 
courts should sit as super legislatures to assess the wisdom or merits of 
state and local economic decision-making—is inconsistent with the 
legitimate judicial role. The Supreme Court has long recognized that courts 
should not substitute their judgment about the wisdom of economic 
legislation and regulation for that of elected legislatures or expert agencies 
in challenges to those laws and policies. As the Court said in Heller v. 
Doe:86 
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis “is not a 
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of 
legislative choices” . . . . Nor does it authorize “the judiciary 
[to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or 
                                                                                                                          
85 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S 229, 242–43 (1984)).  
86 509 U.S. 312 (1993).  
 2016]          THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE AND HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW          1515 
desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas 
that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along 
suspect lines.”87    
A look at the Lingle holding is also instructive:   
The [substantially advances] formula [proposed by Chevron] 
can be read to demand heightened means-ends review of 
virtually any regulation of private property. If so interpreted, 
it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast 
array of state and federal regulations—a task for which 
courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower— 
and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive 
judgements [sic] for those of elected legislatures and expert 
agencies.  
. . . [W]e have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when 
addressing substantive due process challenges to government 
regulation. The reasons for deference to legislative judgments 
about the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory 
actions are by now well established . . . .88 
Horton and Leveque’s proposal would upend this careful balance of 
roles and responsibilities, and subject a vast array of legislative and 
administrative policy decisions to judicial review under a sweeping ten-
factor test that provides little guidance to the reviewing court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ten years ago, Horton and Levesque prevailed in an important Public 
Use Clause case that put to rest emerging calls for heightened scrutiny, or 
outright banning, of a particular category of condemnation cases—those 
motivated by economic development plans or involving transfers of the 
condemned property to other private owners. In so doing, Horton and 
Levesque helped the Supreme Court reaffirm the long-established wisdom 
that public use is a broad concept encompassing anything that serves a 
public purpose and that it is particularly within the province of legislative 
decision makers to determine what projects will serve the public purpose. 
By advocating the adoption and widespread application of a ten-factor 
heightened rational basis review test for every exercise of the power of 
eminent domain, Horton and Levesque threatened to forsake that victory 
and upend the settled wisdom. 
 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 319 (citations omitted).  
88 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544–45 (2005). 
 
